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A STUDY OF INTERPRETATION IN THE CIVIL LAW
MITCHELL FRANKLIN *
I
Pound has indicated that comprehensively law connotes legal precepts,
received legal ideals or ideological aims, and professional legal method or
process.' Historically the interpretation of law in the main has been profes-
sional, such power being exercised by means of juristic ideas pertaining to
legal method.
Hence Coke referred to the "artificial reason" of the English common
law; and Windscheid said that the legal method of the Roman law was
not a science, but an "art" (Kunst), which had to be learned through expe-
rience as well as through theory.2
Past attempts to defeat such esoteric control of law have not been
permanently successful. Hobbes' criticism of Coke's concept of the role of
professional method in English law is now forgotten, though he maintained
that English law is not "(as Sr. Ed. Coke makes it,) an Artificiall perfection
of Reason, gotten by long study, observation, and experience, (as his was.)" 3
Indeed, even texts, such as the French Civil Code, which may have been
formulated to avoid esoteric control, have nevertheless yielded to professional
domination realized by means of professional legal method. The justification
and necessity for the French Civil Code had been developed by the Encyclo-
paedists during the period before the French Revolution. These enlightened
thinkers held that the lawmaker was the supreme educator of a rational
society. They justified codification mechanistically because rational laws would
educate the persons living in civil society and thereby would establish rational
civil society, which in turn would govern through its rational public opinion.
Hegel perceived that this advanced outlook of the Encyclopaedists de-
rived from the Protestant Reformation. He wrote:
"French philosophy does away with the lay or outside position in regard alike to politics,
religion and philosophy.... What the philosophers brought forward and maintained...
was, speaking generally, that men should no longer be in the position of laymen, either
with regard to religion or to law; so that in religious matters there should not be a
hierarchy, a limited and selected number of priests, and in the same way that there
should not be in legal matters an exclusive caste and society (not even a class of pro-
fessional lawyers). . . . Thus, in another form they completed the Reformation that
Luther began." '
* W. R. Irby Professor of Law, Tulane University, New Orleans.
1. Pound, The Theory of Judicial Decision, 36 HA~v. L. REV. 641, 802, 940 (1923);
POUND, OUTLINES OF LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 76 (5th ed. 1943).
2. 1 WINDSCHED, LEHRUCH DES PANDEKTENRECHTS 98 (9th ed., Kipp, 1906).
3. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 193 (Cambridge ed. 1904).
4. 3 HEGEL, LECTURES ON THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 379 et seq. (Haldane and
Simson's transl. 1896).
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However, the history of the French Civil Code has largely been a his-
tory of professional control; and the relationship between the being of the
code and French Encyclopaedism has been obliterated. Hence the French
Civil Code has been absorbed within the history of the Rechtsstaat.
Indeed, modern interest in legal method perhaps may be said to begin
with Savigny, the leader of the German Historical School, who had set
himself the task of arresting the power and influence of the French Civil Code.
Savigny comprehensively organized and systematized the materials of the
Roman law pertaining to legal method, including interpretation and the
closing of lacunae or gaps.5 Even if the force of criticism of Savigny's work
is recognized, the writings of this theorist of the German Historical School
remain a valid introduction to the dogmatic or unhistorical study of the legal
method of Roman and civil law.
II
As Hegel indicated, the Encyclopaedists confronted basic problems with
their mechanistic conception of the educating lawmaker in a rational civil
society, which in turn rules through its public opinion. The theory of these
advanced thinkers has, therefore, received the full brunt of counterattack
and countertheory. It has been perceived that the illumination of the enlight-
ened and enlightening codes and laws, with which the Encyclopaedists hoped
to overcome feudalism, might be extinguished or dimmed by interposing
the power of esoteric professional legal method, so as to dominate the inter-
pretation of the enlightened and enlightening texts. The justification or criti-
cism of the role and power of legal method is, therefore, part of the long
and complicated general history of ideology and philosophy.
Perhaps the outline of the postwar development, designed to strengthen
and to justify the authority of legal method within the civil law, is already
emerging in the theory of Existentialism, the history of which by no means
is disengaged from the history of general European fascist theory, as the
jurist Gurvitch, himself a Phenomenologist, has said.6 Bochenski says that
Kierkegaard turned sharply against Hegelian philosophy because of its "pub-
licness" or "openness" ("Oeffenlichkeit") ; 7 and Bobbio, the Italian jurist
whose L'Analogia Nella Logica del Dirittos deserves translation into English,
for this reason attacks Existentialism as a philosophy which is secretive and
5. 1. SAVIGNY, TRATT DE DsoIT RoMAIN 201-323 (Guenoux' transl. 1840).6. Gurvitch, in WAHL, A SHORT HISTORY OF EXISTENTIALISm 38 (Williams and
Maron's transl. 1949) ; see also GRENE, DREADFUL FREEDOM 38 (1948) ; LFYFBVRE, L'Ex-
ISTENTrALIsmE 212 (1946). See HAESAERT, THEORME GANPRALE Du DROIT 236 (1948).
7. BOCHENSKr, EUROP..ISCHE PHILOSOPHIE DER GEGENWART 160 (1947); see also
LEFEBVRE, L'EXISTENTIALIS5%E 115 (1946). See Kunz, Latin-A icrican Philosophy of Law
in the Twentieth Century, 24 N.Y.U.L.Q. REv. 473, 503 (1949).
8. (1938).
[ VOL.. 3
1950 ] STUDY OF INTERPRETATION IN THE CIVIL LAW 559
impenetrable or "hermetic." Concerning the Existentialist, Bobbio says that
"From beneath reality he conjures up, like a modern magician,9 another reality-an
infra-reality, as is that of psycho-analysis, or a super-reality, as is that of Jaspers-of
which reality, our reality, is only the sign that is to be interpreted. Starting from this
secret conception of being, every form of decadent culture leads eventually to esoterism.
Indeed, one of the inevitable manifestations of esoterism is Hermeticism, which is esoter-
ism in its purely extrinsic and verbal aspect... there is no doubt that the philosophy of
existence is a Hermetic philosophy.... When I speak of Hermeticism ... I mean that
the obscurity of existentialism is not fortuitous but intended, and intended because it
is necessary. To the existentialist even clarity . . . is an illuministic prejudice. . . ."1 2
Hence the code, which the lawmaker or authentic power of the state has
created out of its own projet, is, so to speak, for the Existentialist only the
projet ("Ent-wurf (pro-jet)") by which the Existentialist jurist creates him-
self and his power."
The reception of Existentialist legal theory, thus implicitly criticized
by Bobbio, has already been initiated in the United States; for the most
powerful and most sustaindd Latin-American legal theory, representing
Existentialism, Existentialist tendencies and similar movements, which have
permeated western hemispheric civil law thought, has been translated into
English.' 2
III
Because professional control of both Anglo-American and civil law has
been maintained by means of esoteric legal method, thus excluding the validity
of lay interpretation, both Anglo-American and civilian legal regimes, which
for centuries have developed separately from each other, possess dissimilar
legal methods, including methods of interpretation, with the result that the
jurists of one system have been in a lay position in regard to the legal
method and content of the other. This perhaps has been overlooked by con-
temporary theorists of the unity or unification of law into so-called Western or
world law. Even Austin's elementary discussion of Romanist interpretation and
of the closing of gaps in a Romanist system has not enjoyed the influence
it deserves in the Anglo-American legal world merely as an abstract or un-
historical pricis of such legal method.
Nevertheless, there are forces in the history of contemporary American
law which compel study and understanding of the legal method of Roman and
9. Lefebvre speaks of "l'existentialisine inagique" of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche and
"la ,intaphysique da Grand Guignol" of Heidegger. LEFEVRE, L'ExlsrENTIALISMa 109,
143, 184 (1946).
10. BOBIno, THE PHILOSOPHY OF DECADENTISM 19 (Moore's transl. 1948).
il. BOCHENSxI, EuaoP*IscHE PHILOSOPHIE DER GEGENWART 174 (1947). Grene says
that the stress of Existentialism is "on the project by which the individual creates him-
self." GRENE, DREADFUL FREEDom 63 (1948).
12. LATIN-AMERICAN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY (1948). Felix Kaufman, who died in New
York just before Christmas 1949, hovers over this volume. See LARENz, RECHTS- UNw
STAATSPHILOSOPHIE DER GEGENWART 51 (1931).
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civil law. The increasing importance of codification in internal American
law, adumbrated by the formulation of the uniform laws, of the restatements
of law and of the impending uniform commercial code, the lex Llewellyn,
direct attention to the history and theories of interpretation in Roman and
civil law, which has been codified for centuries at a time.13
Furthermore, on the external side Americans have been confronting
codification. Most countries and areas occupied by the United States or in-
volved with the United States have codified legal systems. 14 There has been
American activity in the codification of international law. The Harvard
pro jets in international law reflect the development which also produced the
restatements of internal law. The codification of private international law in
Latin-America, the code Bustamante, has not been without notice in this
country.
Moreover, the institution of the new international law, based on .the
Charter of the United Nations and other fundamental international agree-
ments and understandings, requires more adequate theories of interpretation
of such consensual acts than have obtained in Anglo-American common law
or under a regime of customary international law.15 Indeed, even customary
international law possibly will be codified. In order to meet the responsibili-
ties of the new situation in international law, resulting from the coequality of
the forces creating the new international law, Anglo-American jurists should,
therefore, study civilian theories of interpretation. At the very least, Anglo-
American jurists are compelled to understand and to recognize that civilian
theories of interpretation are a force within the United Nations and under the
new international law in general. For instance, the Nuernberg Charter, permit-
ting sanctions against the major war criminals of the European Axis states,
was the legal act of the United States and the United Kingdom, both presup-
posing Anglo-American common law method of interpretation, and of the
Soviet Union and France, both presupposing civilian conceptions of interpreta-
tion.16 The creation of the Nuernberg Charter and Tribunal, therefore, showed
the necessity and possibility of co-operation among jurists representing his-
torically differentiated, but coequal, professional theories of interpretation of
legal texts. 17
13. See Franklin, The Historic Function of the American Law Institute: Restatenent
as Transitional to Codification, 47 HARV. L. REV. 1367 (1934).
14. See Franklin, The Legal System of Occupied Germany in INTERPRETATIONS OF
MODERN LEGAL PHILOSOPHIES: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF RoscoE POUND 262 (Sayre ed.
1947) ; Franklin, On the Teaching of Advanwed Foreign Civilians in American Law
Schools, to appear in J. LEGAL EDUC.
15. Franklin, Lessons For the Codification of International Law From the History
of National Codification; forthcoming in TULANE LAW SCHOOL CENTENNIAL ESSAYS ON
THE FUTURE OF CODIFICATION.
16. See Franklin, Studies of the Nueruberg Charter and the Opinion of the Tribunal.
prepared in Secretariat of United Nations (MS) (1948) ; see also Trainine, Le Tribunal
Militaire International et le Procis de Nuremberg, REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DRorr
PENAL 263, 267 (1946) ; DONNEDIEU DE VABRES, LE PRocks DE NUREMBERG 210-20 (1948).
17. Franklin, An Examination of the Legality of the North Atlantic Treaty Under the
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IV
But the problem of understanding the legal method, including the
process of interpretation, of either Anglo-American common law or civil
law, is not solved by making a transition from one abstract esoteric legal
method to the other abstract esoteric legal method. Nor is the problem
satisfied merely by intensive subjective practical activity by the jurist.
Windscheid's suggestion that Romanist legal method could be mastered
through "experience" and Coke's emphasis on the'role of "long stuidy, observa-
tion and experience," do not really adequately state the task involved in master-
ing the legal method of either Anglo-American common law or civil law.
This criticism seems justified because there is no one legal method
within a given legal system, but a succession of legal methods, each arising
from concrete and determined historical situations. Hence the vocation of
the jurist is to master the involvements within a particular social history
which give rise to the historical sequence or unfolding of legal methods, to
grasp the problems of legal development which are thus presented, and to
study the particular legal devices, methods or techniques by which old legal-
social forces may be overthrown, new forces consecrated, new forces deepened
and projected and in time overthrown or weakened. Obviously, this requires
that the jurist possess the highest level of understanding and mastery of social
and legal history if he is to understand the movements of legal method. This
means that the understanding of legal method, Anglo-American or Romanist.
is fettered if it is abstract and analytical instead of concrete and historical.
A process, which, on appearance, seems esoteric and a thing in itself, is
essentially a professional hegemony reflecting the development of social his-
tory, without, however, reducing to or dissolving into social history.
This means that, in reflecting a concrete historical situation, legal
method, including the process of interpretation, may maintain or deepen
legality or overcome or weaken legality. In the latter case the mission of legal
method may be described as paralegal, in that determinations are made
overcoming or weakening the legal force of existing law, although such
determinations purport to yield to the authority of the existing law.' 8 Hence
it seems necessary to discriminate between genuine interpretation, based on
legality or fidelity to the force of the text, and spurious interpretation, by
which the legal force of the text is overcome under the guise of submission
to legality. For example, Thanassis Aghnides, of Greece, justified spurious
interpretation early in the history of the General Assembly of the United
Nations, saying that since it was virtually impossible to amend the Charter
New International Law, 9 LAw. GUILD REV. 36, 39 (1949); see REPORT OF ROBERT H.
JACKSON UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE TO THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON
MILITARY TRIALS, LONDON, 1945, v (Dep't of State Pub. 3080, 1949).
18. Franklin, The Roinan Origin and the American Justification of the Tribunitial
or Veto Power in the Charter of the United Nations, 22 TULANE L. REV. 24, 42 (1947).
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"to do away with the veto ... the only practical way seemed to be 'through
the twin processes of interpretation and the creation, over a long period of
time, of a more liberal jurisprudence [i.e., body of instances or cases].'" 19
However, such spurious interpretation of texts only represents an elementary
type of paralegal method. Roman praetorian law or Roman equity, by which
the praetor overcame the legal force of the Twelve Tables, was a more com-
plex instance of paralegality. Here the praetor even created a rival legal
system, Roman equity which in effect overcame the obsolete legal system,
even though equity purported to yield to the authority of that obsolete
system, which declared or presupposed its own hegemony, its own self-
sufficiency, its own plenitude.
V
On the other hand, the historic vocation of Roman juristic method may
be to maintain, to defend and to deepen legality. The process of deepening
legality represents a brilliant accomplishment of Romanist legal method.
Here the text itself is developed beyond its genuine textual meaning to con-
trol determinations beyond such meaning. Hence Austin distinguished between
extensive interpretation, which may be genuine interpretation, and analogical
development of the text to control new situations, 20 although such distinction
is disputed.2 1 This method of determination, by which a text controls situa-
tions for which it was not explicitly intended, is markedly different from the
classical legal method of the Anglo-American common law which tends to
resort to judicial decision when the legislative text falls short. The Romanist
method, which treats the text both as law and as the source of law, which
recognizes potentiality within actuality, and being as becoming, is a tre-
mendous resource during a period of rapid social transformation through
the formulation of new texts.
The Romanist lawmaking or authentic power 22 may be sensitive to the
potentiality that its text may be thus deepened under the impact of social
development. Indeed, such development of particular texts may be ordered.23
However, Article 2 of the Louisiana Civil Code, inspired by the French pro jet
of the Year VIII, recognizes the general potential force of the entire civil
19. N.Y. Times, Oct 31, 1946, p. 13, col. 2.
20. 2 AUSTIN, LECTURES oN JURISPRUDENCE 1029 (4th ed., Campbell, 1879); see
LENHOFF, COMMENTS, CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION 922 (1949).
21. See BoBBIO, L'AALoGiA NELLA LOGIcA DEL DIuTTo 139 (1938); VASSALU,
LImnmI DEL DIVITo D'ANALOGIA IN MATERIA PENALE 4 (1942). On the importance of
this controversy, see DE SEMAO, ISTITUZIONI Di Dmnro PRIVATO 73 (1946).
22. On techniques of codification, see ANGELESCO, LA TECHNIQUE LL-ISLATIVE EN
MATiARE DE CODIFICATION CIviLE (1930) [reviewed by Morrison, in 9 TULANE L. REv.
471 (1935)]; 3 GtNY, SCIENCE ET TECHNIQUE EN DROIT PRIVt POSITIF (1921); RAY,
EssAI SUR LA STRUCTURE LOGIQUE DU CODE CIVIL FRANC.AIS (1926).
23. See Oertmann, Interests and Concepts in Legal Science in THE JURISPRUDENCE
oF INTERESTS 29, 71 (Schoch ed. and transl. 1948).
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code,24 saying that "its provisions generally relate not to solitary or singular
cases, but to what passes in the ordinary course of affairs," Hence, when the
Louisiana lawmaking power wishes to exclude or limit the analogical force
of a text, it explicitly designates it as us singulare, and hopes thereby to pre-
clude its analogical possibilities.25 For instance, the Louisiana lawmaking
power attempts to maintain the coequality of unsecured creditors, as formu-
lated in the code, by saying in Article 3185 that, "Privilege can be claimed only
for those debts to which it is expressly granted in this Code."
The text of Article 21 of the Louisiana Civil Code also justifies the
development of texts by analogy.26 In an Eighteenth Century formulation,
also received from the French projet of the Year VIII, it is stipulated that
"In all civil matters, 27 where there is no express law, the judge is bound to
proceed and decide according to equity. To decide equitably, an appeal is to
be made to natural law and reason, or received usages, where positive law is
silent." Because it is cast in the mold of metaphysical natural law, this article
may not receive the attention it deserves as a text permitting analogical de-
velopment of the civil code. Nevertheless, if the text of Article 21 of the
Louisiana Civil Code is stripped of its metaphysical form, it discloses a logical
problem which Hegel has discussed. In effect, Hegel suggests that analogical
development is justified only if such unfolding reflects the potentialities of
the actual or positive text, thus making explicit what has become historically
implicit in the existing legal determination. "Analogy," Hegel says,
"is the instinct of reason, creating an anticipation that this or that characteristic, which
experience has discovered, has its root in the inner nature or kind of an object, and
arguing on the faith of that anticipation. Analogy, it should be added, may be superficial
or it may be thorough. It would certainly be a very bad analogy to argue that since the
man Caius is a scholar, and Titius also is a man, Titius probably will be a scholar too:
and it would be bad because a man's learning is not an unconditional consequence of his
manhood." .R
Hence Hegel condemns what he calls "empty and external analogies."
Hegel's consideration of analogy makes it possible to accept the force of
Article 21 without yielding to the metaphysical natural law starting point
from which it purports to derive. This is because the submission to "equity"
or "natural law and reason," ordered by Article 21, and.because the fidelity
to "inner nature" demanded by Hegel, as prerequisites for the analogical
development of legal texts, mean that the development of such texts is justified
24. Franklin, Equity in Louisiana: The Role of Article 21, 9 TULANE L. REv. 485,
501 (1935).
25. ROTONDI, ISTITUZIONI DI DlariTo PRWATO 73 (5th ed. 1945); Franklin, supra
note 24, at 501; Oertmann, supra note 23, at 71.
26. Austin, op. cit. supra note 20; Franklin, supra note 24, at 495.
27. On the exclusion of analogy in Louisiana criminal law, see Morrow, The Louisiana
Criminal Code of 1942-Opportunities Lost and Challenges Yet Unanswered, 17 TULANFE
L. REv. 1, 8 (1942).
28. 1 HFGEL, LOGIC 325 (Wallace's transl. 1892).
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only if such development reflects or deepens the policy and aims of the law-
making or authentic power.
This Aristotelian-Hegelian limitation connotes that purpose or ideologi-
cal aims, the end of law as received from internal social history, to which
Pound has made reference as an element of law,29 determine whether an
analogy justifiably has the force of law. Hence it may be suggested that such
a text as Article 5 of the Law of 1922, introducing the Civil Code of
R.S.F.S.R. (which says that "Extensive interpretation of the R.S.F.S.R.
Civil Code is permitted only in case it is required for the protection of the
interests of the workers' and peasants' State and of the working masses") 30
is the lineal descendant of Article 21 of the Louisiana Civil Code, even
though neither the style of formulation nor the social orders concerned are
the same. On the other hand, Article 1 of the Swiss Civil Code, which, in its
hierarchy of sources for the closing of gaps in the code, says that the judge
may "pronounce in accordance with the rules which he would establish if lie
were to legislate," perhaps may have broken with the full force of this
tradition which is most fruitful during a period of fresh legislation.
VI
The history of Roman and civilian legal method is the history of a suc-
cession of legal methods, reflecting determinate social history, rather than as
the history of abstract legal method or of legal method in itself, has other as-
pects. It is essential to refer here to the role of legal method in the control or
administration of abstract universals, including general clauses, standards,
elastic clauses, etc. This is a vital area of law, not only because modern codes
are increasingly formulated as abstract universals, but because there is a
strong tendency in all modern lawmaking to "flee" to abstract universals.
Furthermore, basic parts of the Constitution of the United States, for in-
stance, the Fourteenth Amendment, have been formulated as abstract uni-
versals.
The role of the abstract universal in law was developed in Roman law,
and because such unhistorical formulations reflect the influence of Stoicism
(and perhaps of Eleaticism) on Roman law, it, therefore, seems proper to speak
of the role of the abstract universal as the Stoic element in law.
The importance of the Stoic element in legal formulation is that such texts
tolerate legal development, contradiction, flexibility and restlessness beneath
the apparent motionless, placidity and calmness of such unhistorical universals.
Such texts in themselves may resist varying professional processes only insofar
as they are not absolutely abstract universals.
Hegel's general criticism of Stoicism may initiate consideration of the
29. Pound, supra note 1.
30. 2 GsovsKI, SOVIET CIVIL LAW 9 (1949).
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problem of the Stoic element in law, insofar as the Stoic element establishes
and maintains professional hegemony over law by means of legal method.
Hegel writes of the Stoics:
"Because the universal law of right reason is alone to be taken as the standard of
action, there is no longer any really absolutely fixed determination.... Thus in as far
as an ultimate deciding criterion of that which is good cannot be set up, the principle
being destitute of determination, the ultimate decision rests with the subject. Just as be-
fore this it was the oracle that decided, at the commencement of this profounder inward-
ness the subject was given the power of deciding as to what is right. For since Socrates'
time the determination of what was right by the standard of customary morality had
ceased in Athens to be ultimate; hence with the Stoics all external determination falls
away, and the power of decision can only be placed in the subject as such, which in the
last instance determines from itself as conscience. Although much that is elevated and
edifying may find its support here, an actual determination is still wanting.... ." "
However, Hegel has not pushed himself to the foundation of his problem.
What Hegel regards as subjective, as determination by conscience, may be
professional activity ultimately reflecting internal development within a par-
ticular social history. Hence a Stoic text, formulating an absolutely abstract
universal, may merely be the appearance of law, whereas the law may, in
reality, be found in the involvements of social history, as reflected profession-
ally. However, it is the Stoic element which is promulgated as having the
force of law, although it is the force of internal social history, which may be
secretive and cunning, that is ultimately the law. Thus, for instance, German
fascism took over and veered the German Civil Code of 1900 by infusing Na-
tional Socialist ideological aims into the existing general clauses of the .civil
code.32
VII
In Roman and civil law the process of legal method may defend legality
(e.g., by genuine interpretation), deepen legality (e.g., development by anal-
ogy), or overcome legality by paralegal activity (e.g., by spurious interpreta-
tion, equity, etc.). Moreover, as the degree of professional power exercised
through the administration of abstract universals or generals is determined by
the absoluteness of the text of such abstract universals, a vast and flexible
subsurface ("le wonderland") competence, exercised through legal method,
may be thereby confided or created.
From this general history the problem emerges of creating-means of main-
31. 2 HEGEL, LECTURES ON THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 267 (Haldane and Simson's
trans. 1896).
32. Franklin, supra note 14; Andrejew, Prof. Mitchell Franklin a Perspektywie
Odbudowy Nienzieckiej Praworzadnosci, 4 PANSTWO I PRAWO 1. 100 (1949).
Because it created a self-determined congressional hegemony, the fifth section of
the Fourteenth Amendment, stipulating that "Congress shall have power to enforce this
article by appropriate legislation," should have excluded professional control of the
amendment, in which the Stoic element is very prominent. Franklin, The Foundations
and Aeaning of the Slaughterhouse Cases, 18 TULANE L. REv. 1, 218 (1943). See Chase,
C. J. in Caesar Griffin's Case, 11 Fed. Cas. 7, No. 5,815 (C.C. Va. 1869).'
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taining the hegemony of the authentic power while at the same time recogniz-
ing the legitimacy of professional legal method, directed toward either legal
or paralegal determinations.
Roman law and civil law have attempted at least twice to resolve this
contradiction by appropriately recognizing or receiving within the professional
process itself all the social forces historically capable of participating in the
authentic power.
Thus, early in the history of the Roman republic the plebeians were strong
enough to wrest from the patrician class recognition of the legal coequality
and cosovereignty of the two forces within the Roman state. Hence the pa-
tricians acknowledged the legal power of the tribunes of thie plebeians appro-
priately to concur with or to veto the patrician administration of justice
(intercessio).33 Because of this self-determined negative power of intercessio
by the plebeian tribunes, the administration of Roman republican justice was
based on the appropriate unanimity or concurrence of the coequal and co-
sovereign social classes.
The tribunitial power was admitted during the period of the formulation
of the XII Tables, which was an episode in the history of the rivalry of the
two social forces, and which constituted a victory for the plebeians, who
wanted a code. Therefore, it has been speculated whether the subsequent para-
legal development of Roman equity or praetorian law, which overcame the
force of the XII Tables, was also based on the appropriate concurrence of
both patrician and plebeian forces acting in the administration of justice.
The resemblance between the idea of the Roman tribunitial power and
that of the collegial Anglo-American jury system was pointed out in the
United States about a century ago.34 Jury activity not only is based oil the
principle of concurrence, but the theory of the choice of American jurors
implicitly seems to recognize the participation of the appropriate social forces
concerned. 35
Moreover, it has been suggested that the unanimity principle of the
Charter of the United Nations, which accords the negative or veto power to
each of the five permanent members of the Security Council, was partly in-
spired and received from Roman legal history, probably because the Roman
conception of the tribunitial power was so influential during the American
struggles over democracy and over slavery.36 Because the principle of con-
currence in the Charter of the United Nations and in the new international
law so clearly relates not only to formulation, but also to the interpretation
33. Franklin, supra note 18.
34. 1 THE WORKS OF JOHN C. CALHOUN 65 (1854).
35. See Patton v. Mississippi, 332 U.S. 463, 68 Sup. Ct. 184, 92 L. Ed. 76, 1 A.L.R.2d
1286 (1947); Franklin, Problems Relating to the Influence of the Roman Idea of the
Veto Power in the History of Law, 22 TULANE L. REv. 443, 444 (1948).
36. Franklin, supra note 18.
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and administration of legal texts, inclvding abstract universals, it should be
described as the principle of concurrence in permanence.37
During the French Revolution the problem of the relationship of authentic
power to professional power based on legal method was also urgently con-
sidered. The Tribunal of Cassation, established in 1790, almost fifteen years
before the civil code was introduced, was conceived as an arm of the legisla-
tive power, and served as a weapon of the revolution against feudal legal
ideas. The Tribunal of Cassation, acting from above, was enabled to con-
firm or to negate judicial activity of the courts which expressly contravened
the text of a law (loi).38 In thus defending the text of the law from the
jurisprudence, that is, from the course of decision by the courts, it was believed
that the revolution was protected.
The cassatory power of the French Tribunal of Cassation thus seems to
reflect the enlightened and rational ideas of the Encyclopaedists whom Hegel
so warmly supported. Moreover, it shows that the influence of Montesquieu
in France was not then the same as in the United States. Montesquieu, who
was ultimately excluded from Encyclopaedism, has in the United States never-
theless enjoyed the role of constitutional and legal theorist, justifying the
separation of the making of law from the interpretation of law, that is, the
separation of authentic from professional power. However, it may be sur-
mised that because of the creation of the cassatory power, Montesquieu was
understood in France, not as a legal theorist, but as a social historian, so that
his conception of the separation of state power was then accepted as a con-
ception of separation of social forces.
Although the cassatory power of French law descended from the tribu-
nitial power of Roman republican law, the original French theory of the cas-
satory power probably has not influenced American legal history as much as
has the Roman conception of tribunitial power.
However, Edward Livingston's scheme by which the judiciary periodical-
ly reported to the legislature for inspection of its activity and determinations
under the Romanist Louisiana Civil Code 39 may have been inspired by the
French idea of cassation. Livingston's scheme, which coincided with similar
thinking by Bentham, has been cautiously applauded recently by an American
judge.40
It is rather interesting that section 25 of the original Judiciary Act of
1789 41 seems to have accepted the cassatory principle, although the text ac-
37. Franklin, supra note 17, at 38.
38. Franklin, supra note 35, at 447, 449.
39. Franklin, Concerning the Historic Importance of Edward Livingston, 11 TULANE
L. REV. 163, 199 (1937).
40. FRAxic, COURTS ON TRiAL 290-91 (1949).
41. 1 STAT. 85 (1789).
568 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [ VOL. 3
quired the force of law about a year, before the institution of the French
Tribunal of Cassation. Section 25 created means of recourse to the Supreme
Court of the United States in regard to judicial determinations by state
courts which in various ways had decided "against" the validity or constitu-
tionality of federal legislation. The effect was that the Supreme Court of the
United States had the power to concur with or to veto attacks by the states on
federal legislative activity. This seems a tribunitial or cassatory power.
